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THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE
ROUND THREE IN AMERICAN EUROPEAN RELATIONS

HELMUT

WAGNER

Introduction
It is hard even to imagine that the United States, which has been firmly
engaged in western Europe for more than thirty years wil 1 evacuate its
garrisons and airbases from that continent.

But to anticipate such a

decision may prove to be more than just an intellectual exercise or apolitical
provocation.

Neither the Europeans nor the Russian leaders seem to

1 ike the idea of American withdrawal. No
evidence in Europe.

11

Ami-go-home 11 campaign is in

Quite the contrary, most Europeans sincerely hope that

the Americans wil 1 stay for at least an indefinite period.
This attitude alone would be worth analyzing.

But more is in question.

Are the reasons for the presence of the United States military in Europe
on territory far away from their own really self-evident?

What binds

American forces to an area which was conquered and 1 iberated more than a
generation ago?
Europe?

Is there in fact no substitute for the American army in

Let us confess frankly that ther€ might be reasons for stationing

some American troops for some time outside of America.
~

But, concerning

Europe, are these reasons sti 11 strong and convincing enough that such an
unnatural state of order should and could last?
are supported by the lessons of history.

For how long?

Our doubts

Foreign troops on foreign terri-

tories always have been symptoms of disorder and temporary arrangements.
Either the territory occupied by foreign troops was bound to be incorporated
or the troops occup y i ngforeign territory were forced to leave sooner or
later.

Has that situation, valid since ancient times, become obsolete in

our own age with respect to the United States?
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Why have American troops been stationed in Europe at all?
and losses of America's mi l itary presence in today 1 s Europe?

What are the gains
And what are

the risks of making Europe herself responsible for her own security and for
her own shortcomings? -- To start thinking before a state of emergency exists
can neither be forbidden nor untimely.

It is the only way, indeed, notto be

taken by su.rp rise, but to master even ts which wi 11 happen anyway, ·whether
one 1 ikes them or not.
I I. The Forced lnvo~vement
The engagement of the United States in Europe during and after the Second
World War has been looked upon by Americans as a short term commitment.

During

the war, this opinion was shared by interventionist and universal ist circles
in the United States.

President Roosevelt noted in a memo dated 21 February

1944, that he could see no chance of stationing American troops in Europe
after the war:
home.

11

1 just cannot do it!

I would have to bring them all back

As I suggested before, I denounce in protest the paternity of Belgium,

France and Italy ... "

At the Yalta Conference, on 5 February 1945, he

explained to Stal in why he would be unable to retain American troops in Europe:
Congress and the People would not permit that "American troops could remain
in Europe for longer than two years."

The opposition against such a formal

and long-term commitment began to melt away only after it was recognized
by Americans that although the war in Europe was won, peace was not secured.
Five years after the American troops landed on the Continent in Normandy,
four years after the end of the war, American soldiers were stil 1 stationed
in Europe, no longer as 1 iberators but as the guarantors of Western Europe.
Withdrawal of these troops was no longer under consideration.

On the con-

trary, they had become an integrated element of the Atlantic Alliance.
They were the backbone, the convincing element of the West European Defense
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Forc es.

The United States committed itself i n Europ e threefold and thereby

determined the destiny of Western Europe f or a generation.
The first commitment of the United States in Europe resulted from the decisions of the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945.

The participating

victorious powers, among them the United States, declared unanimously and
formally that they intended to jointly administer their respective zones
of Germany and sectors of Berl in.

This intention, from the very beginning

described as a _11 mockery 11 by George K. Kennan, proved to be unworkable.
Consequently, the joint Peace Conference scheduled by President Truman for
2 August 1945 was indefinitely postponed.

The American troops remained

where the Second World War and the Al 1 ied wartime agreements had placed them:
in the Western Sectors of Berl in and in the Western Zones of Germany.

Today

they were still there, together with the armed forces of Great Britain and
France.

In West Berl in their presence is based on original occupation rights.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, created in 1949 out of Western Zones,
they derive their legal status from the 1952 Treaty of Alliance.
The Marshall Plan was announced in the summer of 1947.

The United States

thereby initiated and supported the economic reconstruction of Western Europe.
In addition to the Plan's economic objectives, it possessed an inherent
political attraction- for the United States.

John Foster Dul Jes stated this

in his address of 17 January 1947, which was properly described by Walter
Lippmann as

11

a turning point of great significance in the development of

U.S. f oreign policy."

For the first time in the post-war era the United

States possessed a coherent plan for its future European pol icy, supported
by Republican and Democratic leaders alike.

The mai n features of this concept,

which anticipated the economic union of Western Europe, including West
Germany, joined three objectives.

The economic union of Western Europe wou l d,
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first, eliminate f ears of a resurrected Germany and make a new war between
European states impossible.

Second, a long range relief for the United States

f rom its commitments would become possible.
Western Europe would be barred.

And third, Soviet expansion in

The realization of this plan provided the

initial impulse for the Western European nations in their economic and political revitalization and integration.

At the same time, this development also

carried with it the inescapable seed of the East-West division of Europe.
The third self-imposed commitment of the United States resulted from the
conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact in April of 1949.

This supplemented

and expanded an earlier European initiative, the Brussels Pact of the Spring
of 1948.

In the Treaty of Brussels, five European states--Great Britain,

France and the Benelux-states--joined together in a common defense pol icy
and created a joint organization, the Western Defense Committee with its
seat in Fontainbleau.

The Atlantic Pact was subsequently signed by _the 12

original parties in Washington.

Thus the states committed to the integrated

defense of Europe, the goal of the Brussels Pact, were joined by thi United ·
States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Italy!

The number of

states bound by the North Atlantic Treaty Increased to 15 with the accession
of Greece and Turkey in 1952 and of the Federal Republic of , Germany in 1955.
Thereby, a collective security system was created in the North Atlantic
region, north of the Tropic of Cancer, which made an attack on any of its
member states automatically a hostile act against the whole al 1 iance.

The

pact does not have any provisions as to the stationing of armed forces outside of the boundaries of the respective member states.

However, it was

understood and desired--at least in 1949-- by all member states that American
t roops would remain, and that Canadian units as wel 1 were to be stationed
in Europe.

This demonstrated convincingly the main purpose of the Alliance,
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to meet jointly any armed aggression.
cluded for an indefinite period.

I

The alliance was by no means con-

According to the text of the treaty it

was to have been revised after ten years to adjust to new developments.
After twenty years every member state was free to renounce its membership
and to withdraw from the alliance after one year.'s notice.
This unprecedented

but by no means irrevocable conmitment of the United States

in Europe had two immediate consequences.

As the United States assumed the

task of guaranteeing the economic reconstruction, military security, and
political independence of Western Europe, it also assumed burdens and
guarantees which were only calculable on a short-tenn basis.

These commit-

ments were forced upon it by the military and economic impotence of Western
Europe, and by its own superiority in the period from 1945 to 1949.

The

situation of the United States at that time, in April 1949, was described
by Joseph Alsop, who most certainly did not think only of Europe, as follows:
''We are not just knee deep--we are up to our necks--in the cold waters of
world responsibility." Was the United States not in the process of overextending itself in Europe as well as in other areas of the world? With its
threefold commitment, the United States promoted the reconstruction of
Western Europe, the independence of its states, and their first steps towards
political integration.

All this could only have been instituted and achieved

under the political protection of the United States.
Berlin Blockade in 1948 proves this.

The failure of the

The West Europeans alone were unable

to fill the power vacuum that existed in Western Europe after 1945.

Under

the protection and with the aid of the United States, the West European
states were able to recuperate from the wounds of war and to regain international prestige, power, and influence.

But their success and the inter-
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·national constellation, which l i kewise was not going to be justified on the
status of 1949, requires that the continued engagement of the United States
must be viewed today against the background of these changes in the last
30 years.
111 The Unequal Alliance
The fact that the formal alliance and informal ties between the United
States and the West European nations resulted in an unequal partnership, was unavoidable in light of the post-war situation.

That it has remained so to

this day is the fault of the Europeans alone.

They had it in their hands

to give the alliance a different structure.

Through their unification

they, or at least a part of them, could have become an equal partner of the
United States.

Instead, they cemented the unequal partnership by their con-

tinuing disunity.
In the fifties, the road to equality was traveled with the assistance and
the blessing of the United States.

It was blocked, when the French .National

Assembly, or to be. more exact a majority consisting of a coalition of
Communists, Socialists and Guallists, decided on 30 August 1954 not to
ratify the treaty establishing a European Defense Community.

Instead they

returned the Treaty to the committees, without openly rejecting it; there
the matter rests still today.

As a result of this refusal to progress

beyond the traditional concept of sovereignty, what has been done to foster
a European Political Community has remained piecework.

The European

Economic Community, which was founded in 1958 based on the Treaties of
Rome has for its supranational organ, the Brussels Commission.

Created in

1959, the European Economic Free Trade Zone (EFTA), a reaction to the EEC,

quietly has dissolved itself.

With whom shou l d the United States under these

circumstances cooperate? With the formerly six, today nine-member states
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of the EEC? With the former ly thirteen, t oday t en Euro pean NATO partners ?
Or even better, why not deal with each of the twenty West European states
bilaterally? This structural defect in the European Community is the cause
of the ''troubied partnership" between the United States and the disunited
states of Western Europe.
The birth defect of the al l iance has had its consequences.

It has made

the United States the dominant power of this alliance and has condemned it
to assume its leadership.

But a hegemonial power, and that is what the

United States nolens vol ens has become in respect to Western Europe, has
never been welcome anywhere, at best it has been respected.

Its de facto

dominance causes displeasure and fosters suspicion whatever the United States
may do.

This is exactly what the United States has experienced, in Europe

no less than in other parts of the world.

Its prestige decreased in proper~

tion, as the Western Europeans came to believe that they no longer needed its
full protection, especially where the United States had become an obstacle
to their own ambitions.

This is only natural.

It is evident that resent- ·

ments based on feelings of inferiority cannot be eliminated by anything less
than the creation of equality.

Does the United States really deem it neces~ary

to damage its prestige by accepting uncrjtically the role thrust upon it by
a structural defect of the alliance, for which the West Europeans are solely
responsible?
Whether the United States wanted it or not, whether or not it was prepared,
after 1945 it had to accept the consequences of its primacy:

a \'1orl d-wi de

role of leadership which included its relations with Western Europe.
such a position cannot endure in an all i ance of sovereign states.

But

Whi l e

it is desired and accepted in crisis si t uations; i t is unacceptable i n norma l
t imes.

It has been mi t igated by circumstances which have prevented complete
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dissolution of the alliance.

The time has passed when the Western Europeans

were dependent on the economic aid, technological know-how, and industrial
management of the United States.

Even the disengagement of the European

currencies from the U.S. Dollar has taken place.

The still close ties in

these fields are achieved on the bilateral and unilateral bargaining level
and take place to the benefit of all participants through generally wellfunctioning intergovernmental and interorganizational channels.

What remains,

at least in the view of the West Europeans, is a remnant of joint interests
which requires the formal guarantee of the United States.

These interests

consist primarily in maintaining the status quo in Berlin, and in guaranteeing
the defensibility of Western Europe.

Up to now West Europeans alone have

not been able convincingly to secure these common interests.

The first

problem stems from the German question, hopelessly bungled in 1945 and thereafter unresolved.

The other problem results from the impotence and

incapability of Western Europe.

Both seem to require the military pre-

sence of the United States in Europe still today.

But do they really?

The reluctance of the United States to interfere directly in the internal
affairs of the West European nations and to enforce uncompromisingly its
interests even at a time when it was unquestionably able to do so is one
of the extenuating circumstances which have given this uneven alliance such
a long life.

The United States was not compelled to use such methods to

secure its own, limited European interests.

The far-reaching congruity of

interests between the United States and the West European states, their governments and peoples has neutralized to a certa i n extent the di sparity between
them.

If the United States has assumed for a time the role of a prepon-

derant power in Europe, it was not through t he subjugation or patronage of
its European Allies.

The emancipation of the West European nations could
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therefore take place without resistance.

It need not be wrested from the

United States which did not acquire it in a struggle for foreign domination.
What stood and still stands in the way of West European political emancipation is not foreign domination, but the impotence steITTTiing from its own
disunity.

The operative factors conducive to the long-sought union of the

states of Western Europe lack a catalyst; this limits the unity of the continent to the mere facts of geography and to the bond among its people of a
common spiritual and cultural identity; it cripples the unification process.
This process will only regain momentum if the status of Western Europe
is questioned from the outside.
There are other, less openly articulated, but no less valid reasons for
West Europeans to be interested in the continued American presence on
their continent.

The historic fears of a Germany in 1945 has not silenced

them, and they are constantly nourished by the existence of the Federal
Republic of Germany as the strongest economic and military power in Western
Europe.

It is true that these old fears are allayed by new insights.

A

prosperous Federal Republic of Germany is necessary to the prosperity of
the old continent.

An armed Federal -Republic of Germany is required for

the defense of Western Europe as a whole.

This inner conflict of many

Europeans vis-a-vis the Federal Republic can be expressed as follows:
they wish that the Federal Republic could at one and the same time be strong
enough to stand up to the Soviet Union, but without frightening Luxembourg.
The presence of the United States eases their sleep.

But what would happen if

the United States turned its back on the continent? Who could hamper the
Federal Republic from becoming the dominant power of Western Europe?

Who

could stop the Federal Republic if it should decide to exercise its national
option to seek and find a solution to its problems on Soviet terms?

It
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can be anticipated that such a development could best be barred by deeply
and firmly committing the Federal Republic to the West European Community.
By that the possibility of a Germany going it alone would be eliminated once
and for all.

But this seems to be beyond the comprehension of many.

Instead

of creating the conditions needed to eliminate old fears and . to open the way
to new insights that would benefit all Europeans, they seek their future in
a substitute.

The presence of the United States enables them to do so.

How fragile this substitute is becomes apparent whenever the United States
turns to the Federal Republic, lacking another more competent and more
representative European partner.

This immediately causes the phantom vision

of a Bonn-Washington axis to haunt the rest of Europe.

Both suspects are

immediately accused of making arrangements and reaching decisions over
the heads of the others.
take place.

Indeed, bilateral meetings and agreements do

This necessarily adds to the prestige of the Federal Republic,

which has in its ties to Berlin another special reason to seek a close relationship with the United States.

All this makes obtaining consensus in

Western Europe that much more difficult.

It fosters old and new rivalries

and puts the emphasis on the disparities between the Western European
states.
bilities.

The weaker of them feel neglected, refuse to accept their responsiThey react with annoyed, powerless expression of anti-Americanism

and anti-German sentiments.

In this manner the United States fosters, albeit

unwittingly, West European differences.

At the same time these differences

make its negotiations with the governments of disunited Western Europe
difficult and frustrating.

This in turn is the reason why they usually do

not take place, as for example demonstrated in the much-publicized "Year of
Europe."

It is unavoidable that this situation will not improve as long

as Western Europe does not speak with one voice.
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In addition to the neutral i zation of the German threat, t he presence of
United States is desired still for another inner-European reason.

There is

grave concern over the existence of strong communist parties in some Western
European countries, especially in Italy and France.

In this respect the

United States virtually plays the role of assuring that this incorporation
into government would be tolerable and that the expressed sympathy for the
Soviet Union would be meaningless.

The presence of the United States in

Europe is viewed as a hidden trump-card, which can be retained for an
emergency.

But what is the value of this guarantee? That American troops

are not an adequate solution to the internal political problems of foreign
nations should have become apparent.
be counterproductive.

Their use in domestic affairs would

Whatever the United States would do in such a case,

and they could if they wanted to employ other more effective means, recourse
to the American guarantee would be tantamount to political bankruptcy of
Western Europe, a default not covered by the capital represented by the
American presence.
The alleged coercion by the United States functions as an alibi.

The in-

ability of West Europeans to cope with their own problems is thereby defused;
their indifference is dismissed as a mat~er of no consequence.

The high

percentage of communist votes in countries such as Italy and France are
without doubt to a large extent the expression of dissatisfacti6n with the
existing, inflexible party system, one which makes a change of government
almost impossible.

This has not restrained Western Europe's political parties

from dragging the United States into their domestic political squabbles.

On

the contrary, the heat and lack of forethought of election campaigning tend
to make the United States a scapegoat likely to be blamed for anything
imaginable.

Its sins of omission are exaggerated, and entrenched governments

the
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are depicted as its willing accomplices.
votes; otherwise it would not be used.

Appa rently, this appeal attracts
The involvement of the United States

-

in European elections could well be ignored by the U. S., which seems to
have grown accustomed to the ingratitude of Europeans.

But it cannot ignore

the fact that its involvement has long-tenn effects which could be eliminated
quite easily.

This anti-Americanism, which is kept alive by opposition

circles, will, as time goes on, have potentially significant effects on
societal forces, especially the intellectual elites.

They will view the

United States as their number one enemy, and they will no longer be willing
to enter into a dialogue with it.

The United States cannot be indifferent

to this in the long run, especially since it is in its power to change it.
As long as the United States is present in Europe and as long as the Western
European States are not solely responsible for their internal stability and
their external security, it will remain an attractive target.

Only its

physical separation from Western Europe will remove it from the domestic
political firing line.
The engagement of the United States in Europe was necessary immediately
after 1945 to fill a power vacuum.
outside at that time.

It could only have been filled from the

And indeed, it has been filled by non-European powers,

by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Contrary to the Soviet Union,

the United States did not in the past stand in the way of the European
Emanacipation and integration process.

It was not afraid of this process,

nor did it have to be; it promoted it, and it should continue to do so in
the future.

If the function of the military presence of the United States

has changed over the years, then it is time to accept the consequences.
It is no longer the necessary requirement for the emancipation and integration
of Western Europe, but only an alibi not to comolete them, even though this
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has become possible, then t he American presence has lost its intended
purpose.

Then it has digressed from an instrument of change to an obstacle

of change. - The removal of this obstacle would destroy an artificial idyllic
setting in which the West European nations have established themselves in a
manner that limits costs and avoids responsibility.

Deprived of their alibi

they must be thrown in the stormy arena of world politics.

They must be

forced to ,do whatever is in their power and to cope with the necessities.

The

United States would once again serve the Europeans well if it would force
them to act by withdrawing its military forces from Western Europe.

By

doing that, they would serve, last but not least, their own interests.
IV .

The Changed Balance

In the more than 30 years that have passed since the end of World War II,
the international scene, and with it the political status of Western Europe,
has significantly changed.

It is no secret, nevertheless, that foreign policy

conceptions of the present proceed in the i r accustomed path, ignoring the
developments which have evolved since the immediate post-war era, where
their line of thinking remains rooted.

One example of this development

is the changed international status of Western Europe.

In Western Europe

alone, approximately 380 million people live close together in an area of
only 4.3 million square kilometers; of this total, approximately 260 million
people on 1 .5 million square kilometers comprise the EEC.

In comparison,

255 million people live on 22 million square kilometers in the Soviet Union
and 220 mi l l i on people l ive on 9.4 mill i on square kilometers i n the United
States.
Long past are the times when Paul Henri Spaak was able to say ( in 1951 ) that
this Europe• li ved i n the fear of 190 mi ll ion Russians and f rom t he charity
of 150 million Americans.

In 1973, Johan Galtunq ta lked about t he EEC
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a superpower which among the superpowers was exceeded in population only
by China; which had dollar reserves double those of the Americans; which had
a share of- the total world trade ten times that of the Soviet Union; and
whose central attraction for the other twelve West European countries,
together with its association with 54 African, Carribean and Pacific states
would enable it to interfere on almost every continent.

The picture painted

by the Cantonist Galtung, of the factual and potential power of Western
Europe, is so threatening that it should create anxiety the whole world
over.

But this vision is as fictitious as that of Europe's incurable impo-

tence.
Its self-consciousness and prosperity is secured by a bare thread.

Only

320,000 American soldiers, concentrated on strategic points and deployable

on a moment's notice, protect it from a harsh awakening.
of a widely accepted West European fable.

This is the concept

Western Europe has advanced to

become the second largest industrial power of the world.

It does not neglect

to articulate its opinion, although often with many voices, in all international matters.

Reserved seats are awaiting its representatives at all

summits, including those of communist countries.

It has 1 .4 million soldiers
But if only

under arms and even a modest nuclear potential up its sleeve.
one battalion of American troops are to be withdrawn it panics.
cause it becomes aware then and only then of its negligence.
ment is usually only of short duration.

Why?

Be-

This excite-

The immediate assurance of the United

States that it will stand by its commitments and that its troops will remain
in Europe puts the artificial world of the Western Europeans r i ght back
into an acceptable state of being.

As long as they can be sure of the

voluntary hosta9es provided for them, they are not compelled to ensure their
own security.
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What are the reasons t hat this economical ly recuperated, cul t ura lly extravaqant,

and militarily wel l equ i pped Western Europe hides like a mouse
.

when the question of its security arises? Why are the West Europeans, otherwise not at all shy, so reluctant to rely on their own power?

Because they

know only too well that they are weak in their present political condition.
The European Community is politically weak and insecure because it is disunited.

It is disunited because it does not constitute a political union,

one which is able to speak with one voice and to form one common intent.
Its organizational form is that of a Confederation, each one of its members
with the veto, which produces disunity.

Movement toward the goal of

political integration for Western Europe, demanded time and time again, has
come virtually to a standstill.
1958 to 1978.

It has not progressed for 20 years, from

The expected spill-over effect which was to result from the

creation of the Economic Union has not taken place.
Union has not lead to an intensification.

The extension of the

Agreement was reached on the

European Political Cooperation of the Foreign Ministers in 1970.

The

creation of a European Council of Chiefs of State and Government followed
in 1974.

But these are institutions of a federation of states, totally

unfit to serve as building blocks for a federally organized Political Community,
for a Union with only one common supranational policy and decision-making
center.
A few far-sighted European po l itic i ans such as Robert Schumann, Konrad
Adenauer and Alcide de Gasperi, who perceived it, transformed it immediately
i nto a pol i cy concreted for continental unification.

Post St al i nist Russia,

concerned to an ever-increasing extent wi th itself and the conso li dation
of the sphere of influence acquired in 1945, lost its role - perhaps only
temporari l y - as a primary catalyzin9 agent.

It s mil i tary superiori ty
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compared to W
estern Euro pe, whic h has not diminis hed over t he ysars, has
been, in the view of the Europeans, neutralized and offset by American
guarantees.
shifted.

On the economic level, however, the

balance has drastically

Both halves of Europe has recuperated from the effects of the

Second World War.

But the reconstruction, which took place under incom-

parable conditions and prerequisites, has led to a productivity advantage
and a higher standard of living in Western Europe.
a factor for some time to come.
in debt to the West.

This advantage will be

The countries of Eastern Europe are deeply

The government debts of Poland alone, which are guarded

as state secrets, amounted to almost 30 billion dollars by 1979.

In their

relationship to Western Europe, the East Block states, including the Soviet
Union, remain what they were in the past:

markets for industrial products;

potential customers for West European capital, technological know-how, and
industrial management; and suppliers of raw materials and basic foodstuffs.
As far as the ideology of the Soviet Union is concerned, once one of its
most desired exports, it has decreased considerably in value.

It is traded

in intellectual circles of Western Europe below value, just as the Soviet
currency is in Western banking circles.
not convertible.

Both the ruble and the ideology are

What would the Soviet Ynion be if the Red Army were not

stationed along the Luebeck-Pilsen-Szeged-Plovdiv line in Central Europe and
if the nations of Western Europe were united? The Soviet Union would be
nothing more than a power on Europe's flank forced into the defensive.
This loss of attraction and international influence has its causes in
domestic as well as in foreign policy.

The Soviet economy suffers from

partial paralysis even though it possesses large reserves of raw materials
and a sufficient pool of qualified labor.

The anachronistic economic sys-

tem does not seem to be able to eliminate chronic bottlenecks in agricul-
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~ural production and the housing industry.

The whole economic infra-

structure is in a hopelessly backward condition despite and because of
the high degree of regimentation and financial investment.
high growth rates belong to the past.
it amounts to barely five per cent.

The formerly

Since the beginning of the seventies
This is less than the growth rate of

Portugal's economy in the final phase of its authoritarian regime.

The

Soviet leadership is totally engulfed in the internal management of monster
bureaucracies and the control of autonomous forces.
tremely reluctant to institute any form of change.

Therefore it is exThis in turn limits

its flexibility in foreign policy, even in its relations with its client
states in Eastern Europe.
The post-Stalinist Soviet leadership has always asserted itself in foreign
policy when it was absolutely necessary to maintain Soviet power and when
it could do so without risk.

It did not hesitate to intervene militarily in

Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Nor did it fail to actively

support requests for financial aid and foreign policy support wherever it
was asked, as in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, Afganistan and Vietnam.

But especially

this primary interest in preserving Soviet power and its economic emphasis
have allowed the Soviet client states to ·expand step by step their internal
flexibility.

They did not all use fully this area of development.

But

at least the governments of Romania, Hungary, and Poland have realized
that limited emancipation is possible and that to attain it is profitable.
Egypt, Somali, North Korea and Albania have demonstrated that, under special
conditions, even a change of ideological camps is possible.
Fixed, but nonetheless flexible limits of emancipation exist too for the
states located within the Soviet sphere of influence.

The strict observance

of these limits is guaranteed by a number of mechanisms at the top of which
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stands the Red Army, which is present in all Eastern European countries except
Romania.

It is understandable that the Soviet Union is by no means in-

terested in dismantling this imperialistic instrument of power.

This is

also the reason why they not only welcome the presence of American troops
in Western Europe, but actually even fear their withdrawal.

The only valid

alibi for the stationing of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe would be eliminated.

What the American President could do, but so far has not done, the

Soviet Union can hardly dare to risk.

Without forseeable disadvantages to

the domestic policies of the West European nations, the American troops
could be withdrawn at any given time.

The withdrawal of the Soviet military

from Eastern Europe on the other hand would amount to nothing less than a
game of Russian roulette for the Soviet leadership.
At present the Soviet leadership finds itself confronted with a new type of
foreign policy problem.

The Co11111unist world movement, fonnerly a reliable

and willing instrument of Stalin's policies, is divided and can provide either
very limited or no support at all to the Soviet Union.
Soviet sphere of influence.

China has left the

The latent conflict within China seems to be

based on different objectives; it seems to be pre-programmed, based on these
different objectives and intensified by i'deological rivalries.

The unavoid-

able emancipation of the most populous communist country from the Moscow
center has left deep wounds.

If, within the Soviet leadership, there were

still hopes that a communist Western Europe may one day be digested under
Soviet leadership, then they have abandoned
the open break with Peking.

this idea quite certainly after

What the leadership of the Soviet Union secretly

fears, that an independent power of equal or even superior strength may
establish itself on its Western flank, just as China is on its Eastern border,
is the declared objective of the Chinese leadership.

If the Chinese did not
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criticize the stationing of American troops in W
estern Europe in the past,
it was only because they were afraid that the power vacuum resulting from the
eventual withdrawal of American troops in Western Europe would be filled not
from within, but by the Soviet Union.

This danger would lose its credibility

if it could be ensured that Western Europe, no longer at the mercy of the
United States, would unite and fonn an additional center of world power.
Peking would probably have no objections to such a development which would
accord well with its intennediate-zone-theory and with Chinese interests.
At present the communist parties of Western Europe are only of marginal
value to the Soviet Union.

In the Western European countries where they are

strong and able to attract voters, such as Italy, Spain and France, they have
increased their distance in their relations to the Soviet Union.

This is most

certainly not in the interest of the Soviets, but it does not hurt them
either.

The Soviet leadership has accepted this development, which it could

not have prevented in any casa, without letting it come to an open break
between them.
both sides.

The interest in a closer cooperation seems to be limited on
If the Soviet leadership has good reasons not to actively seek a

Sovietization of Western Europe, it is nevertheless in its interest to maintain even a loose relationship with the ideologically close parties of
Western Europe.
~

The Soviet Union finds itself in a situation similar to

other world powers.

It can no longer select its friends under conditions

that assure that they will be willing to readily subordinate their interests
to those of the super power.

It must accept those forces which seem to

guarantee the greatest political advantage.

But these are the great poli-

tical parties of Western Europe, whether they be communist or not.

They

alone are able to offer the economic potential of Western Europe to the Soviet
Union, through state-guaranteed loans for example, and to assure that the poli-
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t i ca l st atus of Wes t ern Europe wil l not ch ang e t o th e di sadvan t a9e of th e
Soviet Union.
For the leaders of the openly or secretly sympathetic parties of Western
Europe relations with the Soviet Union have become a question of poli t ical
They have no reason to praise the Soviet Union as their

opportunity, too.

ideal; this would only reduce their chances of getting elected.

They also

have no reason to make the Sov i et Union the final arbiter of the i r personnel
decisions; this would be against their own interests.

Likewise, they cannot

wish for a time when they would have to take orders in a Soviet dominated
Western Europe; here the experience of history frightens them away.

But to

support their internal political status, to demonstrate that they are not a
lost and lonely group, but part of a worldwide movement of the future, for that
the Soviet Union is still good enough.

What could make their internal poli-

tical radicalism and foreign policy anti-J'.lmericanism more believable than an
occas i onal flirtation with the Soviet Union, or a participation in a communist world conference? This enables them to shock those who are afraid
'

of them and keep the sympathizers for whom a break with the Soviet Union
would be against their ideological faith.

They flirt with the Soviet

Union and hope that a marriage with the Kafkaesque Moscow headquarters
wi l l never come about.

They believe that qeography and the United States

are between them and t his undesirable fut ure.

They can afford th i s fl i rta-

tion without fear of consequences only as l ong as the polit ical geography
of Europe remains unchanged and the forces of the United States stay where
they are.
The internati ona l balance of power estab li shed in 1945 has not shif ted i n
the l ast 30 years in f avor of the Soviet Union.

At t hat t ime the Sov i et

l eadersh i p could enterta i n t he j usti f iab l e hope that East Asia, through the
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defeat of Japan turned into a power vacuum, would fall into the Soviet
orbit.

And for a time it looked as if that might occur.

But today China has

not only gained equality, but has also assumed the leadership in East Asia.
The smaller states in this area now at least have an alternative.
no longer totally dependent on the Soviet Union.
Europe was also ·uncertain.

They are

In the past the future of

The Soviet leadership could have dreamed of the

possibility that the whole of Europe would become a cordon sanitaire.
East Europe, occupied by the Red Army, would be sovietized and thereby
constitute the first protective circle around the Soviet Union.

Western

Europe, militarily impotent, disunited and neutralized, would form the
second protective circle.

The power vacuum in Western Europe expected

to come about after the defeat of Germany and the withdrawal of the United
States, made the possibility of the organization of such a buffer and exploitation zone seem a reality.
Eastern Europe alone.

Today, Soviet influence is restricted to

Western Europe has been excluded from the Soviet

sphere of influence, but still does not depend on its own power; it requires the protection of the United States.

But only when this borrowed

existence has been replaced, when an accepted West European power has become
reality, only then will the post-war period be over.

The transformation of

the European Economic Community into a Political Community is the condition
~

sine qua non of equality with the Soviet Union and with the United States
open to the other European states, in Western Europe as well as in Eastern
Europe, an alternative to the petrified status quo of the post-war era.
V.

The Calculated Risk

The thought that the borrowed political existence of Western Europe seems
destined to become anachronistic is not original.
F. Kennan wrote,

11

Seven years aqo George

We are already approaching a point where Western Europe
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could, if it so wished, effectivel y defend itself, by its own means and
without American assistance, against pressures or efforts f rom the Soviet
side to exert undue influence.

But this point has not yet been reached,

part i cul arl y not in the consciousness of the \>le stern Europeans themse 1ves,
conditioned as they are to seeing their security as rest ing in the American
nuclear umbrella."

Much the same thought occurred to Raymond Aron in 1973,

"What is unreasonable and ultimately unacceptable is that 250 million Europeans with a per capita income far higher than the Eastern European countries
should confess themselves incapable of defending themselves and rush to Uncle
Sam like scared children to beg him not to withdraw a few thousands or
a few tens of thousands of Gis - Gis who, according to Roosevelt, were not
going to stay in Europe anyway after hostilities ended.
some sympathy for this line of argument.

I must confess to

I even happen to think that if the

American diplomats followed . . . (this) advice, they might perhaps render
political Europe a service similar to that which they rendered economic
Europe a quarter of a century ago.

If the Europeans were confronted not with

vague apprehensions about a possible withdrawal, but with the certainty
that the last Gis will have recrossed the Atlantic by a stated date, could
they not find in themselves and in the smell of danger the initiative they
need to rise above their status as protected states?"

What are the risks to

part with the status which has turned from advantage to disadvantage?
The matter in question is the continued presence of American troops on the
European continent, not the close cultural, economic, military, and political
relations between the United States and l>lestern Europe.
from the other?

Can one be separated

It has already been pointed out that the unlimited presence

of American troops, by necessity, encourages a policy of non-concern.

The

West Europeans evade their responsibilities, and treat their obligations lightly;
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they neglect to do what is in their power and tend to believe that they kn ow
and do everything better.

If this were ended by the withdrawal of American

troops from Europe, then it is difficult to conceive how this could add
tension to the relations between America and Europe.

These relations in

effect would be nonnalized through the elimination of this protectionist
relationship.

They could become as nonnal as relations can be between truly

equal partners, both of whom have a wide spectrum of common interests.
There is, indeed, no lack of such common interests and no doubt as to their
continuation.
It is inconceivable that, under changed conditions, a new modus vivendi
mutually beneficial to all participants could not be found, if both sides are
equally interested.

Assuming this common interest, the fonn of Western

Europe's military independence becomes relevant.
come from the American President.

The initiative can only

This is due to the difficulties of the

political situation in Western Europe.

His announcement that the United

States and its European allies are willing to enter into negotiations with
the Soviet Union and other directly interested countries, over the withdrawal
of all foreign military forces presently stationed in sovereign European
states within a period of five years, is · the first step.

This would ex-

clude the withdrawal of troops by the fonner Allies, including the Soviet
Union, from Berlin.

Berlin is the only place in the whole of Europe where

Allied occupation law is still in effect, where the formerly Alli ed Powers
jointly exercise sovereignty.

To hold on to this relic from the post-war

era is warranted by the commitments of the Western Powers, and by the common interest - however diverse the motives for it - in maintaining the status
quo in West Berlin, which is only possible through the military presence
there of the victorious Powers of 1945.

The Soviet Union would have the
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option of reactivating the occupational status in East Beri i n and thereby
maintaining - just as do the other three powers in their respective sectors
a troop contingent of 5,000 soldiers.

This would amount to approximately

20,000 soldiers, the only foreign troops remaining on European territory.
Such a bargaining offer directed primarily at the Soviet Union is only
meaningful if it is intended seriously.

To test .the willingness of the

Soviet Union to negotiate and to determine its flexibility in the course of
an international conference in Berlin is one thing; the determination of
the United States to lead by example, if need be without Soviet compliance,
is another.

But only if both are put together do they become convincing.

The United States has no reason to let anybody dictate to it its presence
in Europe, neither the frightened Western Europeans nor the frightened
They would become virtually collaborators of the Soviet Union

Soviets.

by pampering the anxieties of the Soviet Union, by refraining from doing
the possible merely because the Soviet Union is presently unable to do the
same.

The United States would not serve Western European interests either

if it listened to European governments and refrained from confronting them
with a clear and unmistakable alternative.
For 25 years the unwillingness of the Western European nations to organize
their own defense, and to constitute themselves as one political union has been
~

notorious.

Yet their inability has never been put to the test.

never felt American protection to be burdensome.
geous.

They have

It was primarily advanta-

What should motivate them to move closer together and to provide for

their own defense after they have deemed this unnecessary for 25 years?
Only a challenge which endangers everything they have achieved may be able
to do so.

The announcement of the American President that t he American

troops would be withdrawn f rom Western Europe would have such an effect.
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Either the West Europeans will f i nd the energy t o reorqan i ze er th e Fi nlan dization will be their self-elected dest i ny.

The announcement of the American

President would give them a period of five years, no more.

i~hat the American

presence in Europe was unable to achieve, the American withdrawal from Europe
may well accomplish.
To confront the West Europeans with the alternative of gaining political
stature or relinquishing their political existence is no doubt a fonn of
shock treatment with uncertain outcome.

If their sense of self-preservation

is dead, then the American presence will not help either in the long run.
Then they are beyond saving.

If they accept the challenqe, then they will

have to develop the European Economic Corrmunity into a Political Community.
This could be taken up by immediately summoning a European Constitutional
Assembly to meet in Paris or in London.

This assembly could consist of

an equal number of delegates from the European Parliament and from the nine
national Parliaments.

The assembly could be asked to work out a Constitu-

tion within a period of one year; it would take effect as soon as it had been
ratified by at least six of the nine national Parliaments and by the European
Parliament.

This would ensure that a visible European Government could exist

even before the last American soldier had left the European continent.

If

the United States were detennined to support the European Union, then they
would surely have no interest in preventing the withdrawal of American troops.
One of the first tasks of the newly-elected European Parl i ament certainly
1.110uld be to adjust the military arrangements to the new politi cal status quo.
A bilateral Treaty of Defense could be concluded with the United States and
possibly a multi-lateral Treaty of Defense with those interested West
European states which do not belong to the West European Union.

These aqree-

ments would replace the NATO Pact and would be, l i ke it, in accordance with
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the Charter of the United Nations.

They would provide for a common defense,

the stability and prosperity of the Atlantic region, and secure peace in
this area.

Such a new collective security system which would effectively

cover the North Atlantic region, would permit, indeed necessitate, the reorganization of the West European Armed Forces.

This would include the

creation of a joint European High Command for all combat arms as well as
I

provide for their equipment with the most modern conventional weapons.

The

necessary rearmament of West Europe could take place on the initiative of
the European Government within the realm of a new comprehensive international disarmament agreement or it could at least lead to one.
The European Community would also be automatically a nuclear power.

It did

not necessarily have to become one under the present international power
alignment in order to defend its territory.

This it could do in close

cooperation with other atomic powers, even with conventional weapons.

But

only as a nuclear power, for which purpose it would possess the nuc l ear
potential of France and Great Britain, would it be able to work for a
moratorium which would limit the number of nuclear weapons and make sure
the number of nuclear powers is decreased.

The creation of the political

European Community would replace the bi-polarity of the post-war era and
relieve the superpowers from their respective corrmitments.

It would enable

them to withdraw their forces to their own borders and would immediately
change the conditions for the now ineffectual situation of disarmament
efforts.

Only under a changed international power constel l ation can one

hope that they will succeed.
The dependence of the European integration on foreign policy stimuli is
apparent not only through the thrust of the Stalinist Soviet Union of the
194Os and 195Os.

One month after the creation of the ~larsaw Pact in May 1955
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the founding of a European Economic Commun i ty was deci ded at th e Conference
of Messina.

Si x months af ter the Sov i et invasion in Hungary the Treaties

of Rome were signed.

One year after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovak i a

had taken place, in August of 1968, an extension of the European Economic
Community was decided on.

Four and one half years later, on 1 January 1973,

Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland became members.

Thereafter, following

the oil crisis of 1973, which had a rather disintegrative effect on the community, there was only one event which actually added to the development of
the West European unification process:

the 1978 agreement which on 1 March

1979 led to the adoption of the European Currency System.
When in November 1977, Roy Jenkins, the President of the European Commission, had advocated it, he found no support.

No European Government be-

lieved that it was time to enter into such a risky venture.
aside as unrealistic.

It was put

The Corrmission it was assumed, totally miscalculating

its powers, returned it in order to motivate a reluctant Western Europe to
return to the path of unification.

Six months later, in April 1978, this

subject was the primary topic of discussion at the European summit in
Copenhagen, and within nine months it had been agreed upon.
happened?

What has

What motivated the stubborn governments of France and Germany t o

act so quickly?
The i ni tiative for the real i zation of the European Currency System was
un i ntentional ly provided by the American

administration.

Th e inactive, if

not openly pleased attitude to the decreasing value of the U.S. dollar in
re l ati onship

to other currencies, was vi ewed as an attac k against the

economi c stab ili ty of W
estern Europe, one which could be countered on l y
by un i f i ed action.

Especially affected was the German economy.

Chance llo r

Sc hmi dt was afraid that the export-or i ented German economy woul d t ake heavy
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losses through the price increases, causing higher unemployment, and would
force the Federal Bank to intervene to increase the money supply, in short,
causing a rising inflation rate.

In fact,

the creation of a new "Zone of

monetary stability captured a wide constituency.
11

The European Commission

and the smaller European countries viewed this as a step towards a single
European currency.

Even Italy and France were motivated to integrate their

currency reserves with those committed by the financially stronger countries.
The European Currency System thus served a number of different interests,
but it also proved to be an appropriate tool to protect the European currencies
from the uncontrollable and negative consequences of the dollar fluctuations.
Only the government of Great Britain did not join this concerted action.

In

justification of its domestic reasons for its reservations, two foreign
policy considerations were cited:

the European Currency System would affect

national sovereignty and the System was basically anti-American.

If this is

its effect, apart from other motives, then the history of the origin of the
European Currency System proves that the United States was unquestionably
able to exert pressure on Western Europe. · Pressures, and not insight, have
motivated the majority of the European governments to accept limitations on
their sovereignty.

They realize that they are only strong enough to thwart

dangerous pressure if they are united.

If this impetus stems from an aimless

American policy, how much more effective a determined policy by the American
~

President could be.
To be sure, the main obstacles which according to David Watt block the European integration at the very moment are not easily overcome; the fierce
nationalism of France, the national neuroses of Germany, the post-imperial
insularity of the British and their stubbornly broken down economy, the depressing and ominous picture Italy shows, the distrust and rivalry of all
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the European nations.

It i s evident, however, that t hi s state of disorder

and disunity is not going to be cured by the presence of American troops.
It is a luxury they can afford only because of this presence.

The exper-

ience of thirty years demonstrates that this remedy does not work, even if
it were to be prescribed to the patients for a hundred years and more.

The

proqress West Europe has made so far in the direction of its political union
I

results without exception from pressures launched from the outside not from
within.

The announcement of the heads of all the EC countries, solemnly

proclaimed at the Paris summit in 1972, that up to the end of the decade,
in 1980, the political Union of Western Europe would be realized, was forgotten and suppressed by them until the fluctuation of the dollar frightened
them.

Only then did they start and succeed in working out a commonly sup-

ported arrangement in less than eight months.

The West Europeans have

gotten accustomed to the fact, their instincts have been narcotized by
the fact, that the United States has honored their omissions and has guarded
their existence.

This unworthy state is not to be preserved forever.

prolong it runs against the interests of both sides.

To

To quit it would open

new horizons and could--eventually--muster an up-to-now non-existent willingness and mobilize an up-to-now inadequate strength.
Conclusion
It is not known whether the Europeans themselves will master their future.
If their response will not match the challenge, their fate is detennined.
The United States is neither willing nor prepared to solve the domestic
problems of Western Europe.

Instead, Americans would do better to remi nd

themselves what David Hume has written more than two centuries ago:

"We

are so declared in our opposition to . . . (a single) power and so alert in
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defense of our allies that they always reckon upon our forces as upon their
own and, expecting to carry on . . . (their quarrels) at our expense, refuse
all reasonable tenns of accommodation.
•

ut alienos. 11 *)
11

Habent subjectos tanquan suos; viles

And one should keep in mind, too, what Hume has advised:

To mortga~e our revenues at so deep a' rate in

. ( troub 1es) where we

are only accessories was surely the most fatal delusion that a nation which
had any pretension to politics and prudence has ever yet been guilty of.
That remedy of . . . (holding out), if it be a remedy and not rather a poison,
ought, in all reason, to be reserved to the last extremity; and no evil but
the greatest and most urgent should ever induce us to embrace so dangerous
an expedient.

11

Twice in this century, already, the United States has detennined Europe s
1

history in a memorable and decisive way.

First, in the course and aftennath

of the First World War, by President Wilson s decision to intervene directly
1

and militarily in European affairs and by the decision forced upon him to
leave Europe s population from starvation.
1

Second, in the events and conse-

quences of the Second World War, by liberating half of Europe, by fostering
its recovery, and by making it safe for peace.

There are two audacious and

prudent actions, unparalleled in all history, which made it possible for
Europe to survive and to recover:
the North Atlantic Treaty.

the launching of the Marshall Plan and of

What turned out to be an undeserved windfall for

the Europeans has proved to be a tolerable burden for the United States.
after thirty years of strong and steady involvement,

Now,

when there is no doubt

that the Europeans are strong enough, although not yet willing, to determine
their own future, the time has come to start a third round of American-European
relations.

This time, based on the effective cooperation of two equal and

competent partners stigmatized neither by an isolationism, deep-rooted in
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American history, nor by an overcommitment resulting from a missionary foreign
policy.
•

The conditions of such a relationship are known, its contours

can be anticipated, its necessity is obvious.
action.

What is lacking once again is

The United States is confronted, for a third time in only one century,

with a situation in which it has the chance, and indeed the privilege to
determine Europe's destiny, for better or worse.

*They keep us in submission as if we were their slaves; they consider us
cheap because we belong to someone else. - Tacitus, Hist. Lib., vol .1 ,p.113.

